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To Yoder or Not to Yoder? How the 
Spending Clause Holding in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius Can Be Used to Challenge the No 
Child Left Behind Act 
 
Christopher Roma* 
 
I.    Introduction 
 
On June 28, 2012, the United States Supreme Court issued its ruling 
in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius
1
 (“Sebelius”) 
challenging the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).  
Pundits on both sides of the political spectrum anxiously awaited the 
decision as the most significant social welfare reform legislation in 
decades hung in the balance. As a result of the intense media coverage 
discussing that single issue,
2
 most of the public, this author included, 
believed that the Supreme Court was only ruling on the individual 
mandate provision.
3
  Nevertheless, the individual mandate alone could 
not accomplish near universal health care coverage, so Congress also 
included a provision in the ACA that required States to adjust their 
Medicaid eligibility requirements to cover a greater number of people.
4
  
States who rejected the Medicaid expansion would lose their entire 
Medicaid funding. 
The Medicaid expansion was challenged by numerous states 
claiming that Congress had overstepped its power under the Spending 
 
  * For Erica, my love and my rock.  To my mother, father and entire family, for all 
their love and support. 
1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2. At the time the case was being decided—and to a great extent even today almost 
a year later—if one performs a Google search on terms such as “ACA,” “Obamacare,” 
etc., and attach it to the term “Supreme Court,” the results will focus almost exclusively 
on the Individual Mandate and Commerce Clause. 
3. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (2012). 
1
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Clause.
5
  In a decision which surprised even those people following the 
case closely, the Supreme Court, for the first time ever, found a condition 
attached to a spending program to be unconstitutionally coercive.
6
  The 
idea that Congress could impermissibly coerce a state into accepting 
conditions attached to federal funds was not a new idea.  Since Charles 
C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
7
 the Court had suggested that a theory of 
coercion, in which the federal government used inducements and 
incentives to eviscerate all possibility of meaningful state choice, could 
be a legitimate limit on Congress’ spending power.  However, coercion 
in this context is notoriously hard to define, especially without any clear 
guidance from the Supreme Court.  As a result, a review of the lower 
court cases dealing with the coercion issue highlights a distinct pattern of 
ruling against states, with some courts taking it a step further questioning 
whether they even had the ability to determine “the states are faced . . . 
with an offer they cannot refuse or merely a hard choice.”8 
The difficulty of defining and applying coercion leads to the 
question which this article seeks to explore: 
 
Was Sebelius and the Medicaid expansion simply 
another Wisconsin v. Yoder
9
 or did it set a precedent 
that could be used by future challenges to spending 
conditions to establish unconstitutional coercion? 
 
It is true that the Medicaid expansion was unprecedented insofar as 
the amount of money at stake, and both the Chief Justice and the joint 
dissent focused heavily on this amount of money
10
. But there is reason to 
believe that a challenge to the No Child Left Behind Act brought by 
states who have been denied a waiver under the Obama Administration 
 
5. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1. 
6. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
7. 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
8. Celestine Richards McConville, Federal Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole 
Loopholes, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 163, 180-82 & n.104 (2001) (quoting Oklahoma v. 
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).  Yoder was a Supreme Court case which held that a 
Wisconsin law requiring compulsory school attendance to the age of sixteen violated 
members of the Old Order Amish Religion and Conservative Amish Mennonite Church’s 
First Amendment free exercise rights.  Since the decision, it has been virtually unavailing 
as precedent to others seeking similar challenges because the Amish way of life is so 
unique as it relates to secondary education.  Id. 
10. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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could use the new precedent to crawl out from under the onerous and 
sometimes outlandish conditions attached to Title I money. 
The No Child Left Behind Act (“NCLB”), the latest reauthorization 
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“ESEA”) was enacted 
in 2002.  NCLB was a complete overhaul of the Title I program, the 
largest grant system for federal education funds.  States opting into the 
new program were forced to implement a wide array of federal 
regulatory policies. 
States such as California, Texas, Montana, Nebraska and 
Pennsylvania all have either declined to apply for waivers out of the 
testing, accountability, and penalty schemes of No Child Left Behind; or, 
have had their applications rejected by the Department of Education.
11
  
This Article argues that these states would have a legitimate challenge to 
NCLB as unconstitutionally coercive based on the precedent of Sebelius.  
As discussed more in the sections that follow, not only is NCLB and 
Title I the largest federal funding program behind Medicaid, it also 
shares many of the characteristics that the opinions in Sebelius found to 
be coercive. 
Part II of this Article discusses the history of the coercion theory as 
a theoretical limitation on Congress’s spending power.  This Article will 
focus on the reluctance and difficulty past courts have expressed in 
formulating a workable limit based on an argument that states are 
unconstitutionally coerced into accepting federal spending legislation.  
Part III briefly examines the Affordable Care Act in order to 
contextualize the Court’s ruling in Sebelius.  Part IV discusses the 
Sebelius decision, focusing on the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts and 
the joint dissent authored by Justice Scalia.  Part V provides a brief 
introduction and background of the No Child Left Behind Act.  Part VI 
makes the case that NCLB is unconstitutionally coercive based on the 
decision in Sebelius. 
 
II.   The Spending Clause and Constitutional Precedent Leading up 
to Sebelius 
 
Congress’s spending power derives from Article I, Section 8, 
 
11. See Map of States Approved or Awaiting Approval of ESEA Flexibility 
Waivers, DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/guid/esea-
flexibility/index.html (last visited July 13, 2014). 
3
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Clause I of the Constitution, which states that “The Congress shall have 
Power To lay and collect taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the 
Debts and provide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the 
United States.”12  At the time of Sebelius, there were several existing 
Supreme Court decisions the Court could have used to help resolve the 
issue of whether “Congress exceeds its enumerated powers and violate[s] 
basic principles of federalism when it coerces States into accepting 
onerous conditions . . . by threatening to withhold all federal funding 
under [Medicaid] . . . .”13 
Principal among them were Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. 
Davis
14
 and South Dakota v. Dole.
15
  In Steward, the Court recognized 
the possibility that financial inducements could assert a power “akin to 
undue influence,” but established a presumption against coercion to 
avoid plunging the law “into endless difficulties.”16  Based in part on this 
presumption the Court noted there was no reason to suppose, “that the 
State in that case acted other than through ‘her unfettered will.’”17 
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Congress’ 
broad power to spend for the general welfare.
18
  The Court also 
articulated limits on that power and reaffirmed that coercion, although 
not present in Dole, could be a successful argument given the right 
circumstances.
19
  Dole involved a state law challenge to a federal law
20
 
 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
13. Florida v. U. S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 
2011), petition for cert. filed, 2011 WL 4500702, at *i (U.S. Sept. 27, 2011) (No. 11-
400), cert granted, 80 U.S.L.W. 3297 (U.S. Nov. 14, 2011) (No. 11-398), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
14. 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding an unemployment insurance program provided 
in the Social Security Act, which imposed a federal tax on employers, but gave a ninety 
percent credit to employers who adopted their own unemployment plans meeting federal 
standards). 
15. 483 U.S. 203 (1987) 
16. Id. at 590. 
17. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603 (quoting Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 
301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
18. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (1987). 
19. Id. at 207-09.  Besides coercion, the court placed three internal limits on 
spending which requires it to: (1) promote the general welfare;  (2) unambiguously 
inform states what is demanded of them; and (3) be germane “to the federal interest in 
particular national projects or programs.”  It also placed one external limit: the 
“independent constitutional bar,” which prevents Congress from inducing states into 
actions that the Constitution otherwise restricts.  Id. at 209-210. 
20. National Minimum Drinking Age, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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that directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold five percent of a 
State’s federal highway funds if they would not raise the minimum 
drinking age to twenty-one.
21
  The “condition imposed by Congress is 
directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are 
expended-safe interstate travel.”22  However, the “condition was not a 
restriction on how the highway funds – set aside for specific highway 
improvement and maintenance efforts – were to be used.”23  South 
Dakota argued that Congress exceeded its power under the Spending 
Clause.  The Court rejected the argument because “all South Dakota 
would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum 
drinking age is 5% of her highway funds.”24  Therefore, the Court 
concluded, this was mere inducement and South Dakota retained a 
meaningful choice whether to accept or reject the offer.
25
  Dole and 
Steward left coercion as a theoretical limit on Congress’ spending power.  
Both cases were argued heavily between each of the opinions. 
The Court in Dole also placed three internal restrictions on 
Congress’ spending power, the most important of which is the “clear-
statement” rule.26  In the spending power context the clear-statement rule 
is rooted in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
27
 in which 
the Supreme Court held that states must have notice of a condition at the 
outset.
28
  Legislation passed under the spending power, the Court 
continued, is “much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal 
funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.”29  
This quasi-contractual relationship results in spending legislation that is 
only legitimate if the state “voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms 
of the ‘contract.’”30  This principle of Spending Clause legislation was 
highly contested by the Justices in Sebelius, with the Chief Justice 
supporting his conclusion in large part on the argument that states did not 
have notice of such a drastic change to Medicaid they would be forced to 
 
21. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
22. Id. at 208. 
23. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See Terry Jean Seligmann, Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court and the Clear 
Statement Rule for Spending Clause Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1067, 1067-72 (2010). 
27. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
28. Id. at 17. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
5
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accept.
31
 
In New York v. United States,
32
 the Court reviewed the Low-Level 
Radioactive Waste Act requiring states to either regulate the radioactive 
waste in their border, or to assume the liabilities for damages caused 
through legislation.
33
  The court held that the Federal Government may 
not, consistently with the Constitution, commandeer a state’s legislative 
process by forcing them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory 
program.
34
  Allowing Congress to do so, the court feared, would 
diminish the political accountability of both state and federal 
governments.
35
  The Court also stated that “outright coercion” of state 
governments is incongruous with the inducement rationale from Steward 
and Dole.
36
  However, as in those two cases, the Court failed to provide 
guidance as to what coercion entails or how this type of coercion would 
relate to the financial coercion framework set forth in Dole.
37
  Although 
New York v. United States dealt with legislation outside of the Spending 
Clause, Chief Justice Roberts relies on this anti-commandeering 
principle and the accountability rationale in Sebelius.  Congress may not 
require a state to regulate, according to the Chief Justice in Sebelius, 
“whether . . . directly command[ing] a State to regulate or indirectly 
coerce a State to adopt a federal regulatory system as its own.”38 
 
III.   The Affordable Care Act 
 
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable 
 
31. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605 (2012). 
32. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 145. 
35. Id. at 168. 
36. Id. at 166. 
37. See Charlton C. Copeland, Beyond Separation in Federalism Enforcement: 
Medicaid Expansion, Coercion, and the Norm of Engagement, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 91, 
161 (2012). 
38. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012);  accord 
Note, No Child Left Behind and the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 119 HARV. L. 
REV. 885, 903 (2006) [hereinafter Political Safeguards] (noting that in 2006, prior to 
Sebelius, “[w]hile the Court has not extended [the anti-commandeering political 
accountability] reasoning to federal spending programs, such a move would be logical, 
given that cooperative federalism and commandeering both engender the authority-
tangling that gives rise to accountability concerns.”). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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Care Act (“ACA” or “Act”),39 also known as “Obamacare,” in order to 
increase the number of Americans who have health insurance and to 
begin reigning in the uncontrollable growth in medical costs.  
Organizations and lawmakers threatened to challenge the 
constitutionality of the sweeping reform before the bill reached President 
Obama’s desk.40  As expected, they followed through on those threats.  
Twenty-six states, several individuals, and the National Federation of 
Independent Businesses filed suit, challenging the constitutionality of the 
ACA in the United States District Court for the District of Northern 
Florida.
41
  The challenges focused on two key provisions of the ACA, 
only one of which is relevant to this article: (1) the Individual Mandate, 
which requires most Americans to maintain a “minimum essential” 
health insurance coverage;
42
 and (2) the Medicaid expansion, which 
enlarged the scope of the Medicaid program and increased the number of 
individuals the States must cover.
43
  This note is concerned with the 
challenge to the Medicaid expansion as an unconstitutionally coercive 
exercise of Congress’s Spending Power.44 
 
A. Medicaid Expansion 
 
As discussed in more detail below, it was essential to Chief Justice 
Roberts’ holding that he believed the Medicaid expansion under the 
ACA was in reality an “independent grant,” rather than a mere 
modification of the existing program.
45
  A brief recap of the “old” 
Medicaid system and the changes made ACA is warranted.  “Old” 
Medicaid required States to provide coverage to a limited number of 
needy individuals, e.g., pregnant women, children, needy families, the 
 
39. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). 
40. Health Care Bill Could Face String of Legal Challenges, FOX NEWS (Dec. 22, 
2009), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/22/health-care-face-string-legal-
challenges/. 
41. Complaint, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 
1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91). 
42. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2012). 
43. Id. at 2581. 
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
45. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012). 
7
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blind, the elderly, and the disabled.
46
  There is no mandatory coverage 
and States rarely offered coverage for most childless adults. States also 
“enjoy considerable flexibility with respect to the coverage levels for 
parents of needy families.”47  On average, according to the Chief Justice, 
States were only covering unemployed parents with incomes below 37% 
of the federal poverty line and for employed parents, only those making 
less than 63% of the poverty level.
48
 
The Affordable Care Act, “New Medicaid,” made considerable 
changes.  By 2014, States opting in to “New Medicaid” must expand 
their Medicaid programs to cover all individuals under the age of sixty-
five with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty line.
49
  “New 
Medicaid,” to comply with the minimum levels of the individual 
mandate, required states to establish an “[e]ssential health benefits” 
package.
50
  Finally, and gratuitously, the federal government will pay 
100% of the additional costs of covering the newly eligible individuals 
until 2016, and then gradually decreasing to a minimum of 90%.
51
  
Recognizing these changes will be important for future challenges under 
Sebelius, especially if one concludes, as this author does, that the Chief 
Justice’s opinion will be followed in lower courts and requires 
withholding of funds from an independent program. 
 
IV.   National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius 
52
 
 
The district court held that Congress did not exceed its power under 
the Spending Clause in enacting the Medicaid expansion,
53
 but did 
invalidate the entire Act because the individual mandate was 
unconstitutional and was not severable.
54
  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district courts holding that 
the Act’s expansion of the Medicaid program, enacted pursuant to the 
Spending Clause, was not so unduly coercive as to violate the Tenth 
 
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
47. 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(10)(A)(ii); Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
48. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII). 
50. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
51. 42 U.S.C. §1396d(y)(1); see Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
52. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
53. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1269 (N.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
54. Id. at 1299-305. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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Amendment’s restriction on the use of the spending power to encourage 
state legislation.
55
  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
56
 
and in the portion of the case that had drawn less public attention, 
compared to the fight over the individual mandate, concluded that the 
ACA’s Medicaid expansion provisions exceeded Congress’s power 
under the Spending Clause.
57
  By conditioning receipt of existing 
Medicaid funds on states’ participation in the new Medicaid 
requirements
58
 in the ACA, seven justices in two different opinions 
concluded that Congress unconstitutionally coerced states into 
participating in the new expansion.
59
  As Justice Ginsburg points out in 
her opinion, this marked the first time ever that the “[Court has found] an 
exercise of Congress’ spending power unconstitutionally coercive.”60 
 
A. Chief Justice Roberts Opinion
61
 
 
Chief Justice Robert’s agreed with the Plaintiffs’ argument in this 
case that “[c]ongress is coercing the States to adopt the changes it wants 
by threatening to withhold all of a State’s Medicaid grants, unless the 
State[s] accept[] the new expanded funding and complies with the 
conditions that come with it.”62  The States argued that this contravened 
the Court’s holding in New York v. United States, because the “Federal 
 
55. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1262-69 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 603-04 (2011).  The circuit court 
affirmed the district court’s ruling that the individual mandate was unconstitutional but 
found that the mandate was severable from the rest of the act and therefore reversed that 
part of the districts court’s ruling.  Id. at 1328. 
56. See id. 
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2588. 
58. The two significant new requirements placed on the states under the ACA were: 
(1) requiring States to expand their Medicaid program to cover all individuals under 
sixty-five years old with incomes below 133% of the federal poverty line, 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII); and (2) establishment of a new essential health benefit package, 
which States must provide to all new Medicaid recipients, §§ 1396a(k)(1), 1396u-7(b)(5), 
18022(b). 
59. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566. 
60. Id. at 2630 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
61. Part IV.A analyzes the Chief Justice’s opinion and the joint dissent, hoping to 
establish some of the clear takeaways from Sebelius.  The Chief Justice was joined in Part 
IV by Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan. 
62. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2601; accord Brief for State Petitioners on Medicaid at 
20-24, Florida v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011) (No. 
11-400), 2012 WL 105551. 
9
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Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”63  In agreeing with the plaintiffs, the Chief Justice’s 
opinion made three important analytical moves,
 64
 each of which will be 
considered in turn. 
Chief Justice Roberts, it seemed, was careful to make a clear 
distinction between the two types of conditions that Congress can impose 
on spending grants, which represents Chief Justice Robert’s first 
important analytical distinction.  Congress, the Chief Justice suggested, 
could place conditions on states receiving federal funds that regulated the 
use of that money.
65
  Here, Justice Roberts is making it clear that it is 
well within the constitution for Congress to regulate the use of funds 
granted to the states because “[this] is the means by which Congress 
ensures that the funds are spent according to its view of the ‘general 
[w]elfare.’”66  According to Chief Justice Roberts, these types of 
conditions are not vulnerable to a coercion challenge because as the 
donor, the federal government can impose these type of restrictions, and 
Congress has the power to spend for and define the “general welfare.”67 
In Sebelius, however, the Court was presented with conditions that 
took on an entirely different form.  In this case Congress threatened to 
withhold “new Medicaid” funds for failure to accept conditions; however 
they also threatened to withhold the States’ existing Medicaid funds for 
failure to adopt the conditions attached to the “new Medicaid” funds.68  
Because Congress placed conditions that took the form of a threat to 
terminate other significant independent grants, the Chief Justice stated, 
“the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring the States 
to accept policy changes.”69 
This type of condition triggers the next important analytical step in 
the Chief Justice’s framework.  Relying on and reaffirming the Court’s 
holding in Dole, these conditions required the Court to answer whether 
“the financial inducement offered by Congress was so coercive as to pass 
 
63. Sebelius,132 S. Ct. at 2601 (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
188 (1992)). 
64. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the 
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013). 
65. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04. 
66. Id. at 2604. 
67. See id. 
68. Id. at 2604. 
69. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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the point at which pressure turns into compulsion.”70  Chief Justice 
Roberts then easily distinguished Dole from the Medicaid challenge 
based on vast difference in the amount of money at stake, and also noted 
the “intricate statutory and administrative regimes [states have 
developed] . . . to implement their objectives under existing Medicaid.”71  
Chief Justice Roberts then offered some colorful descriptions to contrast 
the “relatively mild encouragement”72 in Dole “it is a gun to the head” 
and “threatened loss of over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget . . . is 
economic dragooning . . . .”73  The threatened loss of funds in this case 
eliminated the States ability to voluntarily accept or reject the offer “not 
merely in theory but in fact.”74 
There is an important, yet not immediately apparent, point to be 
made here about Chief Justice Roberts’ discussion of the coercive effect 
of the financial inducement in this case.  In his discussion of Dole, the 
Chief Justice said the Court found that threatened loss of 5% of the 
States highway funds as a mere “inducement.”75  This is how far the 
court went in Dole, yet the Chief Justice continued“In fact, the federal 
funds at stake constituted less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s 
budget at the time.”76  The Chief Justice “shift[ed] from the 5% at risk to 
a determination of what the 5% meant for a particular state’s budget . . . 
suggest[ing] that the Court is paying attention to the financial and 
budgetary context in which the ‘inducement’ is made.”77  The Chief 
Justice applied this contextual analysis of coercion to Medicaid, finding 
the States were threatened with the loss of 100% of Medicaid funds, 
which accounted for “over 20% of the average state’s budget.”78  Finally, 
 
70. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 
203, 211 (1987)). 
71. Id. at 2605. 
72. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
73. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
74. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. 
75. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604. 
76. Id. 
77. Copeland, supra note 37, at 164 (emphasis added). 
78. Id. (quoting Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604); see also Shannon K. McGovern, A 
New Model for States as Laboratories for Reform: How Federalism Informs Education 
Policy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1519, 1536 (2011) (supporting taking contextual financial 
realities into the consideration of coercion –  “[t]he states’ ability to make meaningful 
decisions about whether to accept conditional grants depends not only on the amount in 
question and the relative burdens of the strings attached, but also on the vagaries of the 
financial climate”). 
11
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the Chief Justice recognized that States had developed “intricate 
statutory and administrative regimes over the course of many decades to 
implement their objectives under existing Medicaid.”79  By considering 
financial coercion through the lenses of contextual realities the Chief 
Justice opened the door for future challengers to argue that a spending 
condition, practically speaking, left states with no choice but to accept. 
Finally, in the Chief Justice’s third notable analytical development 
to the coercion doctrine, he held that the “new Medicaid” was in fact a 
new independent program and that the states could not have anticipated 
such a change when they signed on to participate in the “old Medicaid.”80  
Leaving aside the lack of explanation for this novel conclusion, it is 
significant for many reasons.  For one, it places the emphasis of the 
coercion analysis on threatening to withhold funds from a pre-existing 
and independent program, in which states’ participation is entrenched.81  
This conclusion also calls into question the significance the Chief Justice 
analysis of the coercive impact based on the contextual realities between 
state and the federal government.
82
  Roberts, by placing the emphasis on 
the States’ lack of notice shifted the inquiry to the time the state 
originally began participation in the program.
83
  This will have an effect 
on future applications if lower courts read this opinion as lacking 
emphasis on the administrative and fiscal realities that impact a State’s 
ability to accept or reject federal spending conditions.
84
  Moreover, it is 
possible that this limitation will leave the coercion doctrine isolated to 
this case, with a result of forfeiting increased political accountability that 
was an important policy justification for Robert’s opinion.85 
 
B. The Joint Dissent
86
 
 
The joint dissent agreed with the Chief Justice’s conclusion that the 
Medicaid expansion was unconstitutionally coercive
87
 and discussed 
 
79. Copeland, supra note 37, at 164. 
80. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2606. 
81. See Bagenstos, supra note 64. 
82. See Copeland, supra note 37, at 161. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. See Bagenstos, supra note 64. 
86. The joint dissent was authored by Justice Scalia with Justices Kennedy, Thomas 
and Alito joining him. 
87. The joint dissent wrote separately to express their disagreement over the 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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similar points made by the Chief Justice relating to the limits on 
Congress’ spending power.88  After the general discussion the joint 
dissent boils the case down to two questions: “(1) what is the meaning of 
coercion in this context?; (2) is the ACA’s expanded Medicaid coverage 
coercive?”89 
The first question, according to the joint dissent, was 
straightforward in the present context – “legitimacy of attaching 
conditions to federal grants depends on the voluntariness of States’ 
choice to accept or decline the offered package. . . . [I]f States really have 
no choice . . . the offer is coercive.”90  Moreover, theoretical 
voluntariness is not enough, the decision to accept or reject must remain 
with the states, “not merely in theory but in fact.”91  The joint dissent 
then turned to answering the second question, whether the ACA’s 
expanded Medicaid coverage left the states with a voluntary choice to 
accept or reject the offer. 
Answering this question, the joint dissent looked principally to the 
size of the Medicaid expansion at issue declaring, “in this case . . . there 
can be no doubt.”92  Like the Chief Justice, the joint dissent assessed the 
massive impact withholding all Medicaid funds would have on the states’ 
overall budgets.
93
  However, the dissent expanded on the Chief Justice’s 
reasoning on this point, couching the financial burden in terms of a 
double loss.
94
  Medicaid is funded by heavy federal taxes on individuals, 
including citizens residing in an “opt out state.”  Therefore, a State that 
opts out of “new Medicaid” loses the federal Medicaid funding (which 
their citizens are still paying for) and is left with a diminished tax base to 
raise revenue to support the state’s own Medicaid type program.95 
 
severability of the penalty provision of the Medicaid expansion. 
88. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2659-61 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the anti-commandeering principle from New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); the requirement that states voluntarily and knowingly accept 
the terms of the contract, and the importance of political accountability). 
89. Id. at 2661. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. (quoting South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987)). 
92. Id. at 2662. 
93. Id. (discussing that Medicaid has long been the largest grant program to the 
states, that states devote more of its budget to Medicaid than any other program, and that 
federal funds account for fifty percent to eighty-three percent of each states’ total 
Medicaid expenditures). 
94. Id. at 2661; see Copeland, supra note 37, at 166. 
95. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2661-62 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
13
  
2014] TO YODER OR NOT TO YODER?  1333 
 
Simply stated, the dissent found the “mechanism of coercion in the risk 
that federal taxes will crowd out the ability of states to raise their own  
revenue.”96  Justice Scalia gave a hypothetical scenario to illustrate this 
point:
97
 
 
Suppose, for example, that Congress enacted 
legislation offering each State a grant equal to the 
State’s entire annual expenditures for primary and 
secondary education. Suppose also that this funding 
came with conditions governing such things as 
school curriculum, the hiring and tenure of teachers, 
the drawing of school districts, the length and hours 
of the school day, the school calendar, a dress code 
for students, and rules for student discipline. As a 
matter of law, a State could turn down that offer, but 
if it did so, its residents would not only be required 
to pay the federal taxes needed to support this 
expensive new program, but they would also be 
forced to pay an equivalent amount in state taxes. 
And if the State gave in to the federal law, the State 
and its subdivisions would surrender their traditional 
authority in the field of education.
98
 
 
This example was a cause for concern for the joint dissenters.
99
  It 
 
96. Bagenstos, supra note 64, at 10; see Copeland, supra note 37, at 166 n.303 
(noting that Professor Lynn Baker, a prominent authority on the Spending Clause and 
cited by Justice Ginsburg, has made this double loss argument to support her contention 
that funding withdrawals that go beyond use regulations for those specific funds are per 
se coercive). 
97. States, education law scholars, and Local Education Agencies (LEA’s), who at 
the time of this opinion continue to be stuck under the onerous federal conditions 
attached to No Child Left Behind Act took quick notice of Justice Scalia’s example.  See 
Mark Walsh, Ed. Law Challenges Loom After Health-Care Ruling, EDUC. WEEK, July 18, 
2012, at 20 (discussing the ruling, noting both Justice Ginsburg and Justice Scalia 
discussed education in their opinions and quoting leading education law scholars as to the 
significance for ESEA, NCLB and education anti-discrimination statutes such as Title 
IX). 
98. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, J., Dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
99. Often, the Court’s conservative block raises federalism concerns in the context 
of an increasing federal role in education. See Walsh, supra note 97.  The joint dissent 
used this hypothetical to illustrate just how intrusive and powerful an unchecked 
spending power could be.  This author believes that education was a strategic selection 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss3/9
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also highlights what is most likely the key analytical difference between 
the two opinions that together made up the seven votes to strike down the 
Expansion as coercive.  The joint dissent’s hypothetical does not involve 
Congress leveraging continued funds on an entrenched program to 
coerce or force a state to participate in a separate “independent 
program.
100
  For the joint dissent, “the combination of ‘large grants’ 
supported by ‘a heavy federal tax’ makes a condition one that states ‘as a 
practical matter, [may] be unable to refuse[,]’”101 once this is determined 
it essentially ends the inquiry into coercion under the joint dissent’s 
framework. 
 
V.   No Child Left Behind Act 
 
The Federal Government became a meaningful player in elementary 
and secondary education in 1965 when Congress passed the Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
 102
 The Act’s flagship funding 
program is Title I, which allocates a majority of all federal education 
funds to states on the condition that they adopt federal directives and 
policies.
103
  The central purpose of Title I when it was originally passed, 
and subsequently reauthorized over the years, was to provide federal 
funding to schools and school districts with a high percentage of students 
from low-income households.
104
  To achieve this purpose, the federal 
grants under Title I were conditioned on conformance with directives and 
regulations on how they could be spent, such as providing mathematics 
 
for the hypothetical because of the current state of federal education policy.  Moreover, 
because education has been recognized as the most important function of state and local 
governments and given the historic nature of this ruling, this hypothetical was not so 
much a simple illustration as it was a foreshadowing of future challenges (notably, No 
Child Left Behind). 
100. Compare Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2662 (Scalia, J., Dissenting) (illustrating, by 
example, double loss in education context as coercive without threatening loss of funds 
from independent grant), with id. at 2605 (Opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (holding the 
threatened loss of funds from existing Medicaid as the unconstitutional coercive action in 
this case). 
101. Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. REV. 83, 
166 (2012) (quoting Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2661). 
102. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No.89-10, 79 Stat. 
27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982)). 
103. McGovern, supra note 78, at 1526. 
104. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994 
& Supp. V 2000)). 
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instruction to disadvantaged students.
105
 
In 2002, George Bush signed into law the No Child Left Behind Act 
(NCLB),
106
 which was a complete revisal and reauthorization of the Title 
I program of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 
(ESEA).
107
  NCLB imposed new substantive provisions
108
 focused on 
testing,
109
 teaching,
110
 and accountability.
111
  These new regulations were 
forced on states that wished to continue receiving Title I funds.  In the 
sections that follow, this article argues that the No Child Left Behind Act 
is analogous to the Medicaid expansion, making for a strong argument 
that under the precedent set in Sebelius, States could successfully 
challenge the law as unconstitutionally coercive. 
 
VI.   Why NCLB and the Medicaid Expansion are Sufficiently  
              Similar to Find NCLB Unconstitutionally Coercive. 
 
A. Size of the Funding Program – How Much Money is at Stake 
 
The most important feature of Title I funds under NCLB and the 
Medicaid program at issue in Sebelius is the shear size of the program.  
Federal funding under NCLB’s Title I, Part A for fiscal year 2011 was 
$14,463,416,198.00.
112
  In 2010, federal education expenditure for all K-
12 funding programs was $70.7 billion, which is just over twenty-one 
 
105. Judith A. Winston, Rural Schools in America: Will No Child Be Left Behind? 
The Elusive Quest for Equal Educational Opportunities, 82 NEB. L. REV. 190, 202 
(2003). 
106. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 
(2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
107. McGovern, supra note 78, at 1526. 
108. For an in-depth discussion on all of the new requirements placed on states 
receiving Title I funds, see Copeland, supra note 37, at 145-51. 
109. See 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (2012) (requiring states to adopt comprehensive plans 
defining adequate yearly progress). 
110. See id. § 6319(a)(2).  A “highly qualified” teacher new to the profession must 
have state certification and demonstrate competency in the relevant subject matter by 
having majored in that subject in college or by passing a state test.  Id. § 7801(23). 
111. See id. § 6311(b)(1) (requiring states to submit to the Secretary of Education 
an accountability plan developing challenging academic standards in math, reading, and 
science). 
112. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDE TO U.S. DEPT. OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS, 
FISCAL YEAR 2011 53 (2011). 
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percent of state K-12 expenditures.
113
  Moreover, to understand the 
amount of money states receive for primary and secondary education 
alone, under Title I and IDEA the average state receives over a half a 
billion dollars each year.
114
  The joint dissent recognized that federal 
outlays for elementary and secondary education were the second largest, 
after Medicaid.
115
  Although falling well short of the amount of money 
attached to the Medicaid expansion, federal education funding under 
NCLB nevertheless represents a significant amount of federal funding.  
A dollar amount that is at the very least marginally comparable to the 
amount of money attached to the Medicaid expansion. 
Moreover, the Chief Justice’s forays into a contextual analysis of 
coercion would allow a challenging state to argue NCLB is 
unconstitutionally coercive.  Many states’ current financial realities 
coupled with administrative investments and structural or other physical 
investments are analogous to the financial realities and investments 
discussed in Sebelius.  For example, prior to the enactment of NCLB, all 
states had statewide testing and accountability systems set up and 
accounted for in their budgets.  The testing and accountability conditions 
attached to NCLB required increased administrative resources, most of 
which exceeded the capabilities of state and local departments of 
education.  Consequently, they required additional funding.
116
  The Chief 
Justice opened the door for lower courts to consider such contextual 
financial realities which all support a finding that NCLB was 
unconstitutionally coercive. 
 
B.  Loss of Other, Unrelated, Independent Federal Funds as a Result of  
 States “Opting-out” of New Conditions 
 
A corollary to the actual dollar amount of federal expenditures to 
 
113. See Nat'l Ass'n of State Budget Officers, 2010 State Expenditure Report: 
Examining Fiscal 2009-2011 State Spending 14 & 16 (2011), available at 
http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report_0.pdf 
[hereinafter “NASBO Report”]. 
114. Id. 
115. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2663-64 (2012) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (“After Medicaid, the next biggest federal funding item is aid to support 
elementary and secondary education, which amount to 12.8% of total federal outlays to 
the States . . . .” (citing NASBO Report)). 
116. Gina Austin, Leaving Federalism Behind: How the No Child Left Behind Act 
Usurps States’ Rights, 27 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 337 (2005). 
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states under Title I, as amended by No Child Left Behind, is the threat of 
losing other, unrelated, Independent federal funds for States failure to 
opt into the reauthorization in 2002.
117
 Principal to the Chief Justice’s 
holding
118
 was the provision of the ACA that provided “if a State’s 
Medicaid plan does not comply with the Act’s Requirements, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare that ‘further 
payments will not be made to the State.’”119 This provision, according to 
the Chief Justice, was “a gun to the head.”120 Yet, Medicaid expansion 
did not take effect until 2014, meaning the Chief Justice was speculating 
that it would leave States with no choice.  That is not to say he was 
incorrect, rather it is to drive home the next pointthere is real evidence 
that States confronted with losing all education funds for opting out of 
NCLB, had no choice and were coerced into opting in.  This is a benefit 
of challenging a law after it has actually coerced States into accepting.  
Here is the evidence. 
To highlight the general opposition to opting in to NCLB, at the 
time it was passed at least thirty-eight states considered legislative 
resolutions condemning NCLB.
121
  Focusing on Utah and Virginia will 
highlight how NCLB threatened independent grant funds and was, just 
like the Medicaid expansion, a “gun to the head.”  In 2004, the Virginia 
House of Delegates passed a resolution condemning NCLB and 
introduced a bill to reject certain parts of the Act.
122
  Virginia was poised 
to render NCLB unnecessary as they believed their statewide SELP test 
was adequate.
123
  The Department of Education, eager to get all states on 
board with NCLB, informed them of the consequences“[the DOE] 
would seek to cut all education funds that had any relation to NCLB if 
the state pulled out or refused to comply with NCLB requirements.  For 
 
117. See infra notes 119-29 and accompanying text. 
118. See Bagenstos, supra note 64, at 5, 7-9 (arguing that under the Chief Justice’s 
opinion, there is a threat to withhold funds from independent grant programs, which 
states have participated in for years as a dispositive element to prove coercion). 
119. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396c). 
120. Id. 
121. See William J. Mathis, The Cost of Implementing the Federal No Child Left 
Behind Act: Different Assumptions, Different Answers, 80 PEABODY J. EDUC. 90, 91-92 
(2005) (detailing state responses to the passage of NCLB). 
122. Michael D. Barolsky, High Schools are not Highways: How Dole Frees States 
from the Unconstitutional Coercion of No Child Left Behind, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 
740 (2008). 
123. Political Safeguards, supra note 38, at 897. 
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Virginia, this would mean a loss of $330 million per year.”124  Virginia 
did not opt-out. 
Utah took a similar path to Virginia.  The Utah House of 
Representatives passed a bill refusing NCLB funds, at which time they 
also received a notice from the Department of Education.
125
  The 
Department of Education informed the Utah Superintendent of 
Instruction that rejecting NCLB would lead to a loss of $43 million in 
Title I funds, even more important to legal and practical coercion, Utah 
would forfeit nearly twice that much in other formula and categorical 
funds.
126
  Despite both houses giving the bill to reject NCLB a favorable 
recommendation a month before, HB 43 ultimately failed to gain the 
necessary votes and was defeated.
127
 
Despite lacking any notice in the statute itself,
128
 both Virginia and 
Utah were threatened with loss of education funds that were not within 
the NCLB/Title I reauthorization bill.  Therefore, similar to the issue in 
Sebelius, states were coerced into accepting an independent spending 
program with threats of losing extraordinary amounts of other federal 
dollars that were entirely separate from NCLB and Title I.  Given that no 
state, significantly including Virginia and Utah, ultimately opted out of 
NCLB, it leads to no other conclusion than the states were coerced into 
NCLB.  In short, they opted in “with a gun to their head.” 
 
C. No Child Left Behind Revised Title I From a Program Aimed at  
 Targeting the Education Gap of Low-Income Students to a Program  
 Implementing Nationwide Federal Education Policy. 
 
As discussed above, the Chief Justice anchored his holding on the 
States’ lack of notice that Congress would condition continued 
participation on a later agreement to also participate in what he pegged as 
a new,
129
 independent Medicaid program.
130
  Yet, the Chief Justice failed 
 
124. Id. at 897 (quoting e-mail from Rod Clemmons, Legislative Assistant, Office 
of Del. James H. Dillard II, to the Harvard L. Rev. (Feb. 27, 2005, 11:17:14 EST) (on file 
with the Harvard Law School Library). 
125. Austin, supra note 116, at 365-66. 
126. William T. Pound, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Task Force on No 
Child Left Behind: Final Report 45 (2005). 
127. Austin, supra note 116, at 366. 
128. See infra Part C for discussion on lack of notice. 
129. States have made a lack of notice argument of the penalties for failing to opt in 
to NCLB and the new Title I program.  Notably, Virginia at the time was considering 
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to articulate a framework for analyzing when an amendment to a statute 
constitutes an entirely new statute.
131
  Even without a clear framework to 
answer this question NCLB has many of the same qualities of the 
Medicaid expansion, lending itself to a similar conclusion. 
First, the Chief Justice notes the original program “was designed to 
cover medical services for four particular categories of the needy: the 
disabled, the blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent 
children.”132 The Chief Justice continued, “Under the [ACA], Medicaid 
is transformed into a program to meet the health care needs of the entire 
nonelderly population . . . .”133  NCLB effected a similar change on the 
Title I program.  In order to continue the receipt of federal funds under 
the existing Title I program,
134
 states were required to adopt new federal 
policies completely unrelated to Title I.  For example, states who 
received Title I funding under NCLB had to have a plan to ensure that all 
teachers in “core academic subjects within the State are highly qualified . 
. . .”135  Moreover, each state was required to implement a “single 
statewide accountability system” as a condition to continued receipt of 
Title I funds.
136
  These examples demonstrate that NCLB effected a 
“shift in kind, not merely degree”137 when it attached requirements for 
schools receiving Title I funds but also mandated requirements of 
schools that received none. 
The Chief Justice also made a point of noting that the States could 
not have been on notice that such changes were permitted under the 
clause allowing Congress to alter or amend the statute.
138
  He addressed 
Justice Ginsburg argument, which highlighted some of the more drastic 
amendments made by previous Congress’s, and distinguished them as 
lacking in the same sort of transformation the current Medicaid 
 
opting out but was informed of the loss of all education funding – something the statute 
itself left unclear and lacking notice to states. See supra Part II. 
130. See Bagenstos, supra note 64, at 9. 
131. Copeland, supra note 37, at 165. 
132. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2605-06 (2012). 
133. Id. at 2606. 
134. Additionally, to continue receipt of other grant funds not directly connected to 
Title I but which rely on the Title I formula, see infra Part II. 
135. 20 U.S.C. § 6319(a)(2) (2012). 
136. Id. § 6311(a)(2)(A). 
137. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2605. 
138. Id. 
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expansion worked.
139
  Similarly, Title I had been reauthorized and 
amended throughout its history; however none of these previous 
amendments had the same degree of revision as NCLB.
140
  Notably, as 
discussed above Title I now placed regulations on schools that received 
none of the funding.  As a result, States who participated in the Title I 
program in its first iteration in the ESEA in 1965 could hardly anticipate 
the drastic changes effected by NCLB.
141
  For these reasons, NCLB 
presents a situation sufficiently analogous to the Medicaid expansion and 
constitutes unconstitutional coercion under the framework laid out in 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. 
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
The coercion theory, that in some instances the Federal Government 
leaves states with no choice other than to enter into conditional spending 
program in violation of the constitution, has eluded Academics and 
Jurists alike since Butler v. United States.
142
  It is not surprising then that 
the Sebelius opinions finding the Medicaid expansion coercive could not 
settle on a single coercion analysis and that the Chief Justice’s opinion 
and the joint dissent inspired such a spirited dissenting opinion from 
Justice Ginsburg.
143
  The question thus becomes exactly when do federal 
spending conditions become unconstitutionally coercive under Sebelius’s 
precedent. 
It is likely impossible for outsiders to discern precisely what 
constitutes financial inducement that is so overbearing that it becomes 
unconstitutional coercion.  It is also likely that future challenges to 
federal spending conditions will produce inconsistent results and 
application of the uncertain precedent set in Sebelius. 
The No Child Left Behind Act, however, is sufficiently analogous 
 
139. Id. at 2606. 
140. Even the Department of Education noted that NCLB differed from the eight 
previous reauthorizations.  The DOE stated the changes as: (1) increased accountability 
for states, school districts, and schools; (2) additional teachers or paraprofessionals; and 
(3) after school and summer programs that extend the regular school curriculum.  Coulter 
M. Bump, Reviving the Coercion Test: A Proposal to Prevent Federal Conditional 
Spending that Leaves Children Behind, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 523-24 (2005). 
141. See Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-07. 
142. 271 U.S. 1 (1936). 
143. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2629-41 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, dissenting in 
part). 
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to the Medicaid Expansion that it is reasonable to foresee a court striking 
it down as unconstitutionally coercive.  Federal education funding under 
NCLB represents the largest federal expenditure after Medicaid and there 
is no real argument that states were left with no meaningful choice to 
accept or reject the new conditions.  While this article suggests that 
NCLB would and should be struck down as unconstitutionally coercive 
under the Sebelius precedent, any challenge, whether successful or not, 
would answer what is arguably the most important lingering question: 
whether coercion will be a legitimate check on Congress’ expansive 
power under the Spending Clause or if Sebelius will be read into oblivion 
as a case that presented unique facts so extraordinary as to prevent future 
use as meaningful precedent.  In short, to Yoder or not to Yoder. 
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